Article

What governs our behavior? (On the hierarchy of priorities). Column in ComputerreOnline #68

The sets of priorities among different people are very, very similar. If we thoroughly examine the mechanisms governing the conflict between good and evil, we will see the same set of motivations.

In many of my columns I have compared human behavior with that of other animals. Time and again I have encountered the same reaction: how can one compare the instinctive actions of animals with the rational planning of humans?
What, then, directs our behavior? The traditionally discussed choice is reason or instinct. In this column I will try to convince you that it is neither. But first, let’s simply clarify what “instinct” actually is.
I find it inappropriate to cite “Wikipedia” as an authoritative source of information on any controversial issue. Of course, most information searches start there, but I use texts written by anonymous authors only as a aid in finding other sources.
Wikipedia reads: “Instinct – a set of innate tendencies and drives that play a motivational role in the formation of behavior. In a narrow sense, a set of complex hereditary‑conditioned behavioral acts characteristic of individuals of a given species under certain conditions.” After this insightful statement there is a reference to the “Biological Dictionary” of the Soviet Encyclopedia. I mentally rub my hands together: good, I will quote a respectable encyclopedia edited by M.S. Hilyarov. Alas! In the dictionary I read: “Instinct (from Latin instinctus – impulse), a set of complex, hereditary‑conditioned behavioral acts characteristic of individuals of a given species under certain conditions.”
An unknown Wikipedia author created a situation in which the reader assumes the reference applies to the whole definition, whereas it supports only its second part, i.e., only the second of the mentioned senses of the term. Whether intentionally or not, this becomes a way to legitimize the first, broader definition. Unfortunately, such ambiguous situations fuel the hottest and most pointless category of debates: disputes caused by differing word usage. One example of confusion appears in the same Wikipedia article: “Abraham Maslow claimed that people do not have instincts because they can overcome their desires. He considered that what is described as ‘instincts’ is actually very strong motives for a certain type of behavior. In his view, instincts were characteristic of people in the past, but later were replaced by consciousness.” In the first sentence, with reference to Maslow, a perfectly reasonable idea is expressed: in the narrow sense, humans lack instincts. In the second, the claim is that humans possess instincts in the broad sense—innate motivations. Finally, the third sentence jumps back to the narrow understanding and opposes instincts altogether (presumably in both narrow and broad senses) to consciousness as such.
Of course, the narrow‑sense instincts defined by the Hilyarov‑edited dictionary do not apply to us. Conscious control of behavior would not allow the realization of a more‑or‑less complex automated sequence of actions. Yet we do have innate motivations, and their operation is demonstrated in numerous studies.
Thus sparks fly in heated debates. Those who interpret the concept in the classic narrow sense prove that humans have no instincts (for example, “Human Instincts” by Protopopov and Vyazovsky is devoted to something that does not exist at all). Conversely, those who see human behavior as guided by irrational innate mechanisms cannot understand how one could deny the obvious.
Honestly, I actually prefer the Wikipedia definition even more than the definition of instincts given by Anatoliy Protopopov: “…by instincts we will understand an innate predisposition (drive, desire, tendency, etc.) of individuals to act in certain situations in a certain way, but not necessarily a rigid, machine‑like, practically fixed sequence of movements.”
Here lies another problem. Is it justified to use the same term for innate motivations as for species‑specific fixed action patterns? Protopopov thinks it is justified and lists many similarities between these phenomena: emotional coloring, triggering by relatively simple signals, dependence on the organism’s state, adaptive character in evolutionary history. On the other hand, if one word denotes two fundamentally different phenomena, disputes will always surround them.
It would be nice if discussions of controversial issues always began with a notification exchange roughly like this: “Variable A is used by me to denote a phenomenon that meets the following definition…; variable B denotes a change corresponding to such‑and‑such definition…” We (except for a few mathematicians) do not do this, because we wield language—a means of communication and a source of misunderstandings.
Therefore, when speaking of human instincts as innate tendencies and drives that play a motivational role, we must either always clarify the sense in which the term is used, or adopt another term. I will choose a compromise. Such mechanisms, in my view, are best called instinctive motivations. This label emphasizes their kinship with instincts while indicating that they are something different from the classic behavioral schemes studied by the founders of ethology.
Provide an example of instinctive motivations? Certainly!
A simple test. A person receives a sum of money. He is told that he must divide this sum in an arbitrary proportion with an unknown partner (in fact, a non‑existent one). He is assured that the partner will never learn the details of the decision or even who made it. An automaton maximizing its own profit would keep all the money; real people “detach” some money to virtual partners. The way the initial sum is divided is a quantitative indicator. One can experimentally determine the frequency distributions of the different choice variants under various experimental conditions, compare them, and, using statistical criteria, assess how different factors influence the choice.
Thus, when an observer watches a person, he gives the virtual partner a significantly larger amount of money. The same effect occurs when stylized eyes are used in the experimental setting. Moreover, in the presence of such eyes people judge others’ immoral actions more harshly. The irrationality of this effect (the mind understands that drawn eyes are not equivalent to a real observer) is evidence that we are dealing with an instinctive motivation.
Does such a motivation trigger a tightly defined complex of fixed actions? No, it merely shifts the distribution of choices toward those that improve reputation. Recall that reputation is not a human invention. Monitoring one’s own and others’ reputation is an important mechanism supporting reciprocal altruism. There are strong grounds to claim that this mechanism operates in a whole range of species with developed intra‑group interactions.
Do you know the power of the mantra “Big Brother is watching you”? It taps into evolutionarily embedded archetypes in us…
Now I will try to explain what I consider the most important problem in explaining behavior and in managing it. It seems to me that priority sets among different people are quite similar. If we thoroughly examine the mechanisms that govern the conflict between good and evil, we will see the same set of motivations. The difference between people who act differently largely lies in how the choice is made, which motive they attend to first.
And do not say that the selection of priorities governing our behavior is carried out by reason. Sometimes (unfortunately, rarely) it is involved in that selection. More often it plays another role—ensuring the implementation of a priority chosen in a way that is not understandable to it. Example? As many as you like.
…I have a vivid example before my eyes: a married couple of friends. Together for two decades. They have successfully passed through the toughest trials together. They suit each other in every respect. Surely they love each other. Unfortunately, they quarrel continuously. Not because of insurmountable contradictions, but because their endless conflicts follow a rehearsed script. One says to the other an unpleasant, cutting or accusatory phrase. There is more than enough reason for this: their long history of quarrels pushes them toward it. The other replies with a cutting phrase of his own, aggressive or offended, but, in general, quite justified given the previous remark. The response is only slightly aimed at escalating the conflict, yet that is enough to fall into the trap. The first (or the second, it does not matter—they are, in this respect, essentially “one devil”) feels an undeserved offense and makes the next verbal move, further raising the conflict’s intensity. Thus they brawl until they go their separate ways. The pain inflicted by the quarrel often pushes both to act out of spite toward each other. Experiencing an undeserved offense or reacting to new painful remarks from the other side leads each to have a substantial score to settle the next time they try to talk, continuing the battle…
Important remark. Both are respectable, highly intelligent people; each is a good specialist, successful in his field. When external blows fell on them, they acted together, proving that they truly love each other and are capable of self‑sacrificial deeds. When I draw their attention to the pathological scenario that repeatedly leads to their fights, they readily agree—and immediately return to the familiar pattern.
What governs their behavior? Not reason. Their mind understands that old grievances hinder them from pursuing their real interests. Not instincts. They have no typical instincts, but instinctive motivations that push them to respond to aggression with aggression are present in everyone. Previous activations of these motivations have honed the debate stereotype. Such motivations and such stereotypes exist in almost every one of us, but not all of us fall into their trap. Where is the decision made to continue the argument or change the record?
About a year ago it struck me what the strategies that govern our behavior are. Strategies are hierarchies of priorities. In fact, a conscious or unconscious shift in the relative importance of priorities, resulting from the rise of some motivation, is a change of strategy that governs our behavior. But… who or what changes them?
Reason? No. Consciousness? No. Instincts? No. Guardian angel? No. Tempter demon? No. Lord God? Also no. So what?
I have an answer. The answer to the posed question is a single word, well known to everyone. I do not want to use it at the very end of the column, because it is not an explanation in itself. What matters is not the name we gave to what makes such a choice, but the rules by which this choice is made. Perhaps another time…