Krasilov, 1997. Metaecology-18. Games. Mephistopheles

Logos. Galatea. The Sword. V.A. Krasilov. Metaecology. Moscow: Paleontological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997. 208 p. Part 18. Games. Mephistopheles. Mephistopheles (conclusion). Faust. Games The conflictual relationship between the proto-ego and the meta-ego extends to the systems they create — and which, through the principle of feedback, create them in turn — biological, social, and metaecological systems. These systems were superimposed upon one another and maintained continuity. Their development was governed by common systemic laws. At the same time, each of them possesses its own functional constraints, perceived as certain rules of a game in which the human being participates not by his own will. For Pythagoras, the model of life was the Olympic Games, where some compete, others profit from the competitions, and a third group — the wise — observe, remaining outside the game. Yet contemplation itself is also a game with its own rules. The perception of life as a game is especially characteristic of classical antiquity, when philosophers, in search of an impressive form for their ideas, staged improvised theatrical performances in gymnasia and palaestrae, in the manner of Socrates. Plato, in the Laws, defines human life as a tragicomedy. In the Middle Ages, the sense of play is less apparent — probably because people did nothing but play their guild and ritual roles, and for a professional actor, the performance is reality, beyond which little else remains. After the Renaissance, play separated from life, and once again there arose the impression that the whole world was performing, as was inscribed on Shakespeare's Globe Theatre. "The whole life of men is nothing other than a certain comedy, in which all men, wearing masks, play their roles until the choragus leads them off the stage" — wrote Erasmus of Rotterdam in "In Praise of Folly." The thought that our life has been conceived and performed by someone else is not so fantastical. Both natural and social and metaecological systems develop according to a certain scenario and have a standard set of roles. Having donned a mask, a person grows accustomed to others' conception of him, which ultimately leads to the loss of his own self-conception. The sense of play is thereby lost, and the person risks complete absorption by the system. In the natural system, the distribution of roles is dictated by the efficiency of resource utilization and stability. The first goal is served by producers of living biomass, its consumers, and the utilizers of waste; the second — by pioneers that capture new habitats and restore disrupted structure, preparing the ground for more stable forms capable of long-term resistance to external influences. The ancestors of man played by the same rules, creating social systems in the image of natural ones (the clan system, patriarchal communities), with still predominantly biological division of labor based on sex and age differences. Having expanded the confines of the role structure of the biological community and not yet feeling the rigidity of social constraints, man indulged for a time in the illusion of freedom. Life seemed an irrational game without rules, in which everything was decided by the magical will of the tribe, concentrated in its totem. This was a highly productive period, which ended with the formation of rigid social structures. Gradually the rupture with nature deepened and turned into confrontation. Man exceeded the evolutionarily established norms of resource extraction (in particular, those limiting consumption to ten percent of the biomass of each trophic level) upon which the ecological pyramid rests, thereby undermining its foundation. He usurped the roles of other species, displacing them from ecological niches, creating a tendency toward simplification and further loss of stability. As a result, the problem of resource depletion arose, which undermined the might of ancient civilizations and increasingly threatens modern civilization. As the terminal link in food chains, man concentrates all pollutants in his organism — such is the price of dominion over nature. The prevalence of the technosphere creates a tendency toward the robotization of man, which manifests most clearly in modern warfare — the triumph of technology over flesh. Apparently, there is no other way out than the adaptation of the technosphere to the biosphere according to the principle of complementarity rather than coercion. This means a transition, following the example of biological evolution, to practically inexhaustible resources (wind energy, tidal energy, geothermal heat instead of nuclear energy, which uses scarce raw materials), assimilation of technologies to natural processes, incorporation of natural rhythms into management models, alignment of technogenic substance cycling with biogenic cycling. The results of human activity in any case are superimposed upon natural processes and may either counteract them, preserving equilibrium, or amplify them, pushing toward catastrophe, as occurred with the Aral Sea (see my book "Nature Conservation. Problems, Principles, Priorities," 1992). Society has the same goals as the natural system: efficiency of resource utilization, protection from external influences, stability of existence. A person suffering from color blindness risks being struck by a vehicle when crossing the road on a red light. It is better for him to watch not the traffic light but the people crossing with him. In doing so, he foregoes the freedom to make his own decision, transfers responsibility for his life to others, hoping thereby to preserve it. These are the rules of the social game, which constantly elicit a multitude of complaints. It is asserted that man is the master of his own fate, that only he who each day goes into battle for life and freedom deserves it, and at the same time that he who purchases security at the price of freedom deserves neither freedom nor security. There is a view that public morality is for the inferior — those who not only burden society with themselves and their deficient heredity, but also impose upon the superior rules of conduct convenient for themselves. One is urged to labor, struggle, and in general to live selflessly — that is, to sacrifice one's life for the benefit of one who, sacrificing nothing himself, reaps the fruits of one's selflessness. This situation, called by F. Nietzsche imposed altruism, underscores the similarity between social and natural systems. Society has its own parasites, predators, and prey. But only a very superficial sociological theory can content itself with the observation of analogies. Sociality, like sexual reproduction upon whose basis it arose, represents, first and foremost, a mechanism for compensating biological inequality, for removing defective individuals from the operation of natural selection. Society preserves that part of natural diversity which has been rejected by the biological system. The artificial imposition of selection in social systems contradicts their purpose and leads to social stagnation. Athens, as is well known, left an immeasurably deeper mark on the history of civilization than Sparta, which eliminated the weak and was fit only for the conduct of military operations — until a renewal of strategy was required. Human sociality was formed on the basis of biosocial systems in which functional roles are distributed in accordance with differences between sexes and age groups. In this context, artificial delay of sexual maturation (in worker bees) or the retention of young sexually mature individuals within the family group, who are used as helpers for raising the next generation (in many mammalian species), is practiced. The energetic contribution of the female to reproduction is incomparably greater than that of the male and, with full utilization of reproductive potential, leaves practically no energy for anything else. Don Juan actively invests his genes, thereby acquiring remarkable life experience, while Messalina remains barren, and for a woman who gives birth frequently, individual experience is limited to what was acquired before the first childbirth. On this basis arose a division of functions in care for offspring that has been preserved to some degree to the present day. It is no coincidence that folk wisdom holds that a woman should be beautiful — her contribution to offspring is primarily genetic — while a man should be experienced — his contribution is primarily pedagogical. However, with the development of the social system, the roles of the sexes in care for offspring are increasingly equalized, in connection with which sexual dimorphism is also being eroded. In the social mechanisms of governance, which must be as impersonal as possible (it is not manual laborers who are being replaced by machines, but managers), there persists a certain ineradicable biological element — vestiges of the hierarchical feeling — a mixture of fear and love — experienced by animals toward a dominant individual. Playing upon these feelings leads to social inequality being passed off as natural, with privileged strata claiming the role of a certain genetic elite with blue blood, whether created by natural selection or of divine origin. It is not difficult to observe that social revolutions — including the women's liberation movement — are directed primarily against such borrowings, and the only tangible result of them consists in the abolition of biological and divine privileges, of elements from other systems. At the same time, attempts to liquidate social roles as such cannot succeed. The schema by which the triumph of liberty, equality, and fraternity culminates in tyranny has been known for more than two thousand years, yet people find themselves again and again in the grip of social illusions. The abolition of roles not only makes the system inefficient but also leads to universal competition — the war of all against all — which in effect precludes the possibility of freedom. A more promising path, apparently, lies in the complexification of social structure, in the increase of the number of roles — social niches that afford people the possibility of dignified coexistence without competition with one another. In nature, competition is conditioned by the limitation of resources — the "capacity" of the system — in comparison with the reproductive potential of rapidly multiplying organisms. In populations of heterosexual organisms, competition simultaneously proceeds for sexual partners (the "reproductive resource"), whose number is also limited in comparison with sexual potential. However, with the increase in efficiency of resource utilization, the differentiation of ecological niches, parental care with a reduction in birth rate, and the emergence of monogamous families, competition weakens. This is the main developmental path of natural systems. We still consider competitiveness a mark of quality, though in reality it is conditioned by the conjuncture — often artificially created for the marketing of surplus goods, ideas, "culturgens," or other products of technological and spiritual production. Technological innovations are progressive only on the condition that they do not sharpen competition but, on the contrary, allow its avoidance by creating new productive niches. A scientific discovery becomes a possession of humanity, opening — like electronics or cinematography — new fields of activity in which people of a pioneering disposition, who do not always withstand fierce competition, may find application for themselves. It would perhaps seem laughable, were it not so habitual, the rivalry between two schools in the domain of culture, whose potential capacity admits of dozens of alternatives. If two outstanding actors vie for a role, there is no point in provoking competition. It is better to supplement the scenario in such a way that both may manifest their talent in it. This is, probably, the optimal path for the development of social scenarios. Those who are alike compete; those who are different do not. Therefore, with the development of individuality, competition dies away. A strongly expressed individuality is beyond competition, since its social niche cannot be filled by anyone else. When such a condition of society is achieved, people will in fact become irreplaceable; for now, this is a distant prospect. The metaecological system stands most in need of purification from the social rudiments adhering to it, which cause one to see in its organizing principle — god, fate — a clan head or a strict superior. Metaphysics, moreover, prescribes for the faithful not only rituals of worship but also diet, as well as rules of sexual conduct. Fasts and periods of abstinence are usually attributed to some hard-to-explain health rationale, though in reality their meaning consists solely in controlling all manifestations of life, beginning with the most elementary. For genuine power belongs to one who dictates what and when one may eat, with whom and how one should mate. The relations among the various spheres of life, ideally complementary, turn into competition and even mutual or one-sided aggression. After all, each of the three systems has its own image of freedom, which cannot be mechanically grafted onto another system. The reproductive ideal presupposes sexual freedom, the social ideal — freedom in the distribution of roles (social equality), the spiritual ideal — freedom of conscience. If liberation from passions is a necessary condition for freedom of conscience within the metaecological system, then at the natural level, dispassion would lead to the collapse of the reproductive system. The natural principle within man himself, like external nature, is subjected to violence — both from the side of society (the intrusion of class relations into sexual and kinship relations) and from the side of metaphysics, which has traditionally suppressed sexuality. In liberation from these alien influences lies the true meaning of the struggle for equality of the sexes, which has already lasted more than two thousand years. At its head have stood Ruth, Aspasia, Messalina, Mary Walker — in all ages, female sexuality has been suppressed to a greater degree than male. In this struggle, a striking confusion of concepts is manifested, connected with the superimposition of elements from different systems. The actual goal — the emancipation of the natural principle — in this case is masked by a spurious goal: the sexual equality of women and men, which is unnatural and is directed not so much toward the rehabilitation of the natural human being as against him. For the differences in sexual behavior are connected with the biologically purposive division of roles in the process of reproduction. Sexual selectivity proved to be the most important evolutionary achievement on the basis of which human individuality was formed. Its absence throws us back, to the level of lower invertebrates. Equally contrary to nature is the separation of reproduction from love: this feeling developed in counterbalance to the primary aggressive reaction of two individuals who have entered into contact. Without it, sexual aggression is exposed in its most unseemly form. The family arose in connection with the prevention of incest and genetic degeneration (it was precisely these factors that compelled the ancients to trace their genealogy; its social aspect is secondary). The destruction of the family is the result of the intrusion into the reproductive sphere of utopian sociology (Plato, Marx), not the restoration of natural sexual freedom. Having liberated reproductive relations from metaphysics, we are by no means obliged to turn into animals and go down on all fours, although in terms of natural relations this posture contains nothing shameful. It may, rather, be considered reprehensible to impose upon metaphysics poses borrowed from the zoological repertoire. Spiritual revolutions were accomplished for the sake of liberating the metaecological system from the rules of the game alien to it, imposed by other systems. The Son of Man, for all his greatness, stands in a fraternal relationship with all people and makes no claim to being their father. He sets love against competition and renders unto Caesar what is Caesar's, thereby separating the spiritual from the social. He affirms the a priori equality of all people within the metaecological system and the possibility of each making his own contribution to it. In this way the existence of the meta-ego will be prolonged beyond the death of its mortal twin, the proto-ego. Mephistopheles In the system of twins, the decisive factor turns out to be the non-coincidence of their existence in time. The meaning of time as a special function of developing systems consists in the commensuration of processes occurring within them at different rates; our difficulties in understanding time are connected with the fact that we use externally referenced measurement systems — such as the rotation of celestial bodies — to determine physiological age, which is erroneously identified with calendar age; as a result, the illusion of the autonomy of time arises — in nature no such time exists. The problem of time arose as a result of the complex interweaving of physical and metaphysical concepts. Time as a coordinate of motion, a mathematical abstraction, was transformed with remarkable ease into a coordinate of the metaecological system. And now journeys through time become possible — journeys that trample upon the logical structure founded upon causal relationships — as does our participation in events that concluded long before our appearance on earth. The linearity of the laws of thermodynamics imparts directionality to the development of a system, be it a society or an individual, creating the illusion of the irreversibility of time, reflected in the inexorability of fate. Reversibility, as a negation of the natural order of things, can only be the result of diabolical machinations. Yet the temptation of a bargain with the devil is periodically experienced by both individuals and entire peoples. Indeed, in an open system, interaction with feedback leads to changes in the direction of development that are of a periodic character. The connection between times disintegrates in the process. These are the crises of the system, followed by renewal. A child first develops more rapidly in physical terms than in spiritual ones. Then comes a period of formation of the "second self," in which the ratio of rates is reversed. During puberty, time changes sign again. These are the critical points at which passage renders the system especially vulnerable to external influences that can destroy it with relative ease. In nature, a crisis occurs as a consequence of the desynchronization between the rates of environmental change and the adaptation of organisms. It is usually connected with external influences — cosmic, geological, or anthropogenic — that accelerate environmental change. Evolutionary processes are thereby reversed, as we have already discussed. Social crises are conditioned by the divergence of the rates of individual and social development, by the emergence of large numbers of "superfluous people" for whom no social niche is found, and by the antagonism between the individual and society that is inevitable in such cases. A vivid example of this is the stratification of Russian society following the Petrine reforms and the emergence of the intelligentsia — a Europeanized stratum of educated people. Isolated from the main patriarchal mass of the country's population, the intelligentsia was compelled to create spiritual products for its own consumption, constantly experiencing in this connection a sense of its own superfluousness. On this basis, a stable complex of self-destruction formed within the intelligentsia, assuming the most diverse forms — from simplification of lifestyle and "going to the people" to flight from the country and physical annihilation. By virtue of this, the intelligentsia — which may be considered a specifically Russian national phenomenon (of course, intellectuals exist in other countries too, but they do not form so isolated a stratum and rarely find themselves superfluous) — became a permanently acting factor of instability and a detonator of social cataclysms. The tragedy of Russian history lies in the never-accomplished formation of an integral social system. Crises assume catastrophic form when external causes — most often metaphysical ones — are superimposed upon them (in contrast to this, the discrepancy between economic development and social structure, as the experience of successfully developing countries shows, can be overcome without particular upheaval — it does not serve to attribute to economics the role of ancient fate). People, as a rule, aspire not so much to advance forward toward a new life as to turn time back toward the old one. Thus Cromwell's Puritans and the French sans-culottes dreamed of early Christian equality and purity of morals. The crowds who followed Pugachev wished to restore a peasant tsar to the throne in place of the Europeanized empress. The masses who followed the red banner saw their ideal in the peasant commune, not in the distribution of surplus value according to Marx. In the perestroika of the 1980s there participated people who wished to restore Stalinism, to return to Leninist principles and the NEP, or further back still — to the Stolypin reforms, to Russian capitalism, to absolute monarchy. When all want to live as in the old days, a revolutionary situation arises. There is nothing surprising in this, since the thermodynamic logic of a system's development suppresses man, engendering nostalgic feelings. The rebellion against thermodynamics provoked by these feelings leads to the collapse of the system, thereafter compelling one to dream of its renewal. The metaecological crisis matures as a result of the discrepancy between the rates of development of the meta-ego and the environment of its habitation, piled high with the refuse of spiritual activity — metamort-mass (in the Middle Ages, devils, witches, and sorcerers were part of everyday life; the Renaissance displaced them from the sphere of the quotidian into the sphere of the fantastical, and our technical age transformed them into UFOs). But metaecological revolutions too require an external impetus. Thus the Aryans destroyed the theocracies of the East, the Trojan War engendered Homeric ethics, the Peloponnesian War engendered Athenian philosophy, and the Judean War engendered Christianity. In nature, revolutions (J. Cuvier used this term; his opponents preferred to speak of catastrophes) are accompanied by the mass extinction of dominant species. Social revolutions often begin as protests against the cruelty of those in power and are accomplished with unprecedented cruelty. Christian spirituality was established upon the ashes of ancient libraries. The temple can ultimately be cleansed of money-changers, but only at the cost of the destruction of the temple itself. It is considered, moreover, that victims are justified if they help overcome the crisis of the system and open a prospect for progressive development. Already Heraclitus reduced the essence of life to struggle, and even the meek Jesus brought not peace but a sword, championing those who do not hide their candle and do not waste their lives like the dog in the manger. Dante placed people unable to take sides in the struggle in the category of the "contemptible," closing before them the gates not only of paradise but of hell as well. The European philosophy of action found its embodiment in the Storm and Stress movement, of which the young Goethe was an activist. The dying monologue of Faust — about the daily battle for life and freedom, subsequently paraphrased by Marx — became the manifesto of the liberal intelligentsia; it was memorized. But with whom did Faust do battle? In his declining years he had no enemies other than time, whose course he could by no means manage to arrest. Time cunningly transforms life into a machine for processing the future into the past. There is no freedom, because every step restricts the choice of the next, every lived moment becomes past before ever becoming present. The pact with the devil, concluded for the sake of freedom, has meaning only if it includes the possibility of stopping the moment. Faust's battle with time could not but end tragically. The moment he had stopped, Mephistopheles calls empty, contemptible. Faust destroyed but was never able to build anything. The city being raised on the lands won from the sea exists only in his imagination. It is the lemures who are imitating the noise of construction. God, it is true, may evaluate the situation differently from the devil. Intentions matter more to him than results. Nevertheless, in repeating the monologue about struggle and freedom as a kind of manifesto, one should not have forgotten that the aging Goethe placed it in the mouth of a blind, deceived old man, thereby expressing the deepest disillusionment with the philosophy of action and the utopia of freedom. For in rebelliousness there are mingled two conceptions of freedom — relative and absolute. Relative freedom means that each possesses no less freedom than any other — in other words, it reduces to equality (in freedom as in unfreedom alike). Revolutions are accomplished in the name of equality — relative freedom from caste, property, sexual, and other privileges. Whenever one form of inequality is eliminated, another acquires overriding significance. Thus in a caste society, property inequality itself plays no great role (the aristocrat despises the moneylender from whom he borrows money). Even natural inequality was partly smoothed over, since representatives of different castes did not compete with one another. In an egalitarian society, universal competition exposes natural inequality as an inevitability that can be combated in only one way — by raising individuality to the level of genuine uniqueness, at which competition dies away of itself.

Crises take on a catastrophic form when external causes are superimposed, most often metaphysical (in contrast to this, as the experience of successfully developing countries shows, the discrepancy between the pace of economic development and social structure can be overcome without particular shocks - one should not attribute the role of ancient fate to the economy). People, as a rule, strive not so much to move forward, towards a new life, as to turn time back, to the old life. Thus, Cromwell's Puritans and the French sans-culottes dreamed of early Christian equality and purity of morals. The crowds that followed Pugachev wished to return the peasant tsar to the throne instead of the Europeanized empress. The masses that moved under the red flag saw their ideal in the peasant commune, not in the distribution of surplus value according to Marx. People who wanted to restore Stalinism, return to Leninist principles and NEP, or even further back - to Stolypin's reforms, Russian capitalism, absolute monarchy, participated in the Perestroika of the 1980s. When everyone wants to live in the old way, a revolutionary situation arises. There is nothing surprising in this, since the thermodynamic logic of the system's development forces a person, giving rise to nostalgic feelings. Rebellion against thermodynamics, provoked by these feelings, leads to the disintegration of the system, forcing one to dream of its revival afterwards.

A meta-ecological crisis brews as a consequence of the mismatch between the pace of meta-development and its environment, overflowing with the waste of spiritual activity - metamortmass (in the Middle Ages, demons, witches, and sorcerers were part of everyday life; the Renaissance shifted them from the sphere of the ordinary to the sphere of the fantastic, and our technical century has turned them into UFOs). However, meta-ecological revolutions also require an external impetus. Thus, the Aryans destroyed the theocracy of the East, the Trojan War gave rise to Homeric ethics, the Peloponnesian War gave rise to Athenian philosophy, and the Jewish War gave rise to Christianity.

Revolutions in nature (J. Cuvier used this term; his opponents preferred to speak of catastrophes) are accompanied by mass extinctions of dominant species. Social revolutions often begin as a protest against the cruelty of owners and are carried out with unprecedented cruelty. Christian spirituality was established on the ashes of ancient libraries. The temple is eventually cleansed of usurers, but only at the cost of destroying the temple itself.

It is believed, however, that the sacrifices are justified if they help overcome the system's crisis and open up prospects for progressive development. Even Heraclitus reduced the essence of life to struggle, and even the peaceful Jesus did not bring peace, but a sword, defending those who do not hide their candle and do not waste their lives in vain, like a dog in the manger. Dante relegated those who could not make up their minds in the struggle to the category of 'nobody,' closing the gates of not only heaven but also hell to them. European philosophy of action found its embodiment in the Sturm und Drang movement, whose activist was the young Goethe. Faust's deathbed monologue about the daily struggle for life and freedom, later paraphrased by Marx, became a manifesto of the liberal intelligentsia; it was memorized.

But who was Faust fighting? In his old age, he had no other enemies than time, the race of which could not be stopped in any way. Time cunningly turns life into a machine for processing the future into the past. There is no freedom, because each step limits the choice of the next, each lived moment becomes the past without ever becoming the present. A pact with the devil, made for the sake of freedom, makes sense only if it implies the possibility of stopping the moment.

Faust's struggle with time could not but end tragically. The moment he stopped, Mephistopheles calls empty, worthless. Faust destroyed, but could not build anything. The city, built on lands reclaimed from the sea, exists only in his imagination. Lemurs imitate the sound of construction. God, however, may assess the situation differently than the devil. For him, intentions are more important than results. However, when repeating the monologue about struggle and freedom as a certain manifesto, one should not forget that the aging Goethe put it into the mouth of a blind, deceived old man, thus expressing the deepest disappointment in the philosophy of action and the utopia of freedom.

For in rebellion, two concepts of freedom intertwine - relative and absolute. Relative freedom means that everyone has no less freedom than anyone else, in other words, it reduces to equality (both in freedom and in captivity). Revolutions are carried out for the sake of equality - relative freedom from caste, property, gender, and other privileges. Every time one type of inequality is removed, another becomes predominant. Thus, in a caste society, property inequality itself was not of great importance (an aristocrat despised a usurer from whom he borrowed money). And even natural inequality was partially leveled, as representatives of different castes did not compete with each other. In an egalitarian society, the competition of everyone with everyone exposes natural inequality as an inevitability, which can only be fought in one way - by raising individuality to the level of active uniqueness, at which competition dies on its own.

Logos. Galatea. Sword.

V.A. Krasilov. Metaecology. M.: Paleontological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1997. 208 p. Part 18.

Games. Mephistopheles.

Mephistopheles (conclusion). Faust.