Ecology: the biology of interaction. 6.23. (supplement) Principles of rational environmental ethics

Ukrainian language (latest version) / Russian language (update discontinued) 6.22. (supplement) Should we fear GM products? D. Shabanov, M. Kravchenko. Ecology: the biology of interaction Chapter 6. Human ecology and nature conservation 6.24. Eco‑conversion 6.23. (supplement) Principles of rational nature‑conservation ethics If not me for myself, then who for me? If I am only for myself, then what am I? If not now, then when? Rabbi Gilliel When the subject of ethics expands its boundaries and includes, alongside values produced by humans, values created by the environment, then we will actually be able to become optimists about the future of humanity. Eugene Odum Humanity stands at a sharp turning point in its history. Each of us, to some extent, participates in choosing its further developmental trajectory. It is clear to each of us that a future in which a free and happy humanity and a stable biosphere exist is far better than a future in which civilization collapses in a devastated environment. It is far less clear how each of us should act to promote the first scenario and counteract the second. We need to change the principles by which we make decisions concerning our habitat, the biosphere as a whole, and individual organisms or resources. These decisions must concern both our everyday life and our activity as citizens (when choosing a state development strategy) or as specialists (in professional activity). It is obvious that it would be good to return the biosphere to its “pristine” state or at least to preserve in its current condition all its surviving elements: all natural ecosystems, all species diversity, all unique organisms, all unspent resources. Unfortunately, such a wish is a utopia. Humanity continues to grow and requires substantial resources to sustain its existence. A sharp reduction in the size of our species as a result of various catastrophes would lead not to the preservation of the environment but to its destruction. At best we will be able to save something, and we will have to sacrifice something else. How to determine what individual people and humanity as a whole should protect (at a more or less substantial cost and sacrifice) and what they may transform and use? Any human action is a choice. The result of a choice is influenced by three groups of factors: biological, ethical, and rational. The biological bases of our behavior were laid down when our species or its predecessors could not significantly alter their habitat. Despite the rapid growth of the population and its capacity to transform the environment, the biological nature of humans remains relatively unchanged. Ethical factors are culturally conditioned. In their main outlines they were formed in an era when humanity was fragmented into local groups fiercely competing with each other for resources. The third group of factors is related to reason, which allows us to anticipate some consequences of human choices. The rational part of our behavior turns out to be the most mutable, and adaptation to changing environmental conditions occurs mainly thanks to it. We cannot change the biological foundation of our behavior, but we can influence its culturally conditioned mechanisms. By developing the capacity for rational foresight (improving methods of forecasting, modeling, and science in general), we must also change our ethics—the system of values and rules that determine our way of acting. Humanity will reach the desired state when the overwhelming majority of people consider moral the actions that lead to that state and immoral those that hinder such development. In modern language the concepts of ethics and morality are close and often interchangeable. We are closer to the viewpoint that distinguishes these concepts. Thus, ethics is the science of morality, its fundamental foundations. Morality (from Latin moralis—ethical) is the set of culturally conditioned norms that define which actions are socially approved, obligatory, correct. Morality determines not only relations between people (subject–subject relations) but also extends to the actions of subjects toward objects. If we recognize that some actions toward natural objects are correct and others are not, we apply moral evaluations to them. These evaluations must be based on some foundation defined by ethics. The term “ethics” (Greek ethos—custom, character) was introduced by Aristotle to characterize human traits that determine virtues. Ethics sets the structure of values, ideals, basic aspirations on which moral norms are based. Principles describing the interaction of individual people and humanity as a whole with the biosphere also belong to the sphere of ethics. This part can be called nature‑conservation ethics. Often the term “environmental ethics” is used in this sense, but it is, first, less accurate, and second, has become tightly linked with a certain circle of ideas. Nature‑conservation ethics can ensure humanity’s survival only if it aligns with our biological nature and rests on our reason. We must clearly understand what and why we must protect and for what we will have to impose self‑restrictions. These self‑restrictions must be acceptable for our biological essence. Can an effective nature‑conservation ethics be built on principles that are fundamentally new for humanity? Probably not, because in that case it would not correspond to our nature. Can it be arbitrary, dependent on whim (“we will care for giant pandas because they are cute, and we will not protect other bears because they are less appealing”)? No, such an approach would make our actions irrational and would not allow us to fully use our reason. Therefore, to construct it we need to understand what reasons can make an object valuable for us from the standpoint of its protection, select a sufficient but not excessive set of reasons, and learn to evaluate them argumentatively. All possible grounds for protecting a given object can be divided into two groups of reasons: those related to benefit (utilitarian) and those related to duty (ethical). The expression of utilitarian reasons is economic value, actual or potential; the expression of ethical reasons is ethical value. Consider a simple example. Why should sturgeon be protected? Benefit‑related arguments may be: because sturgeons provide useful and delicacy food; because trade in black caviar and sturgeon meat can replenish the budget; because sturgeons are important for the self‑regulation of water bodies; because in the future they may yield valuable medicines, etc. And also because sturgeons are an amazing group of fish, without which the Earth’s fauna would be impoverished; they are living and we can sympathize with them; now is a critical moment in their history, and if we preserve them now, this group can survive into the far future. The second group of explanations concerns the value and uniqueness of possible objects of protection. Explanations appealing to benefit (cost) and to value are not reducible to each other. Hence, methods of selecting objects for nature‑conservation activity can be divided into three groups: utilitarian (primarily oriented toward cost in one form or another), nativist (primarily oriented toward ethical value), and comprehensive (taking both into account). Let us examine them in more detail. Utilitarianism (anthropocentrism). The ethical component in utilitarian concepts is quite simple: it is ethical what is useful to humans. If a resource can be used beneficially, it is not good to waste it without benefit. If we consume a resource not too quickly, we can in total consume more of it, so we should not rush. Utilitarianism by nature is oriented toward obtaining benefit for the human itself. One of its forms is the concept of rational use of natural resources, widespread in the former USSR countries. Unfortunately, the existing experience of applying a utilitarian approach has systematically led to the loss of natural objects deemed useless. To fully assess the benefit of a particular object, one must possess complete knowledge of all interrelations of all objects, which is unattainable. The pursuit of profit characteristic of the utilitarian approach to our habitat contradicts our natural (biologically predetermined) perception of the natural environment as a value independent of us. Both the individual and society that strive solely for their own profit are perceived by us as morally deficient. Unfortunately, the utilitarian worldview leads to a characteristic narrowing of consciousness, where what is unprofitable becomes uninteresting. The modern ecological crisis is, to a significant extent, a consequence of a utilitarian attitude toward nature protection. This does not imply that potential benefits of natural resources should be ignored, but, from our point of view, the limitations of such an approach must be acknowledged. Nevertheless, the utilitarian approach has become quite familiar to most of our compatriots. It remains predominant in textbooks and is actively used in education when explaining the practical and economic value of various living organisms. A school textbook states: “Animals are a source of food for humans, as well as raw material for industry” (Yu. G. Verves et al., 1997). Departing from the topic, we note that the study of zoology will become fascinating for schoolchildren when they begin to study animals not as something useful, but as our amazing relatives, evoking genuine interest and sympathy beyond considerations of practical profit. Nativism. The opposite of utilitarianism is nativism, which places the interests of “wild nature” above human interests. The well‑known proponent of “environmental ethics” V. E. Boreiko lists the following reasons for nature protection: Protection of wild nature is a good act in itself and an act of charity; wild nature possesses intrinsic value and interests and does not need justification from outside; it is a trampled minority and has natural rights to freedom and existence; it is other in relation to humans and a sacred space; it is a global and inter‑species heritage; it was created by God; not only people but also wild nature is subject to salvation; all life is sacred; it is indecent to profit from the suffering of other beings; protecting wild nature expresses our love, respect, admiration, reverence; it (protection) is an act of charity, patronage, and a divine work; it expresses our empathy, pity, compassion, magnanimity, kindness, and gratitude; it is the protection of an independent state; it is our duty, obligation, and moral responsibility; it is important from the standpoint of justice; it is the protection of absolute beauty or good and the atonement for humanity’s fall; humans should be ashamed of destroying wild nature (as presented by V. E. Boreiko, 2004). The list is highly indicative. A significant part of it is simply a repetition, in various forms, of the conclusion that actually needs justification. For a person who does not share these beliefs, such a statement will have no argumentative force. Another group of arguments appeals to divine will. People with various religious views, as well as those free from them, will not be able to use arguments based on any sacred covenant as universally convincing. Finally, some of the listed arguments are based on transferring ideas taken from other contexts onto natural objects: rights of an independent state, political minority, religious salvation. “…in order for politicians to pay more attention to nature protection, we should first grant voting rights, at least to animals (representatives of chordates), as the most rational and feeling, after humans, among Earth’s beings” (V. E. Boreiko, 2006). According to Boreiko, diverse chordates, from lancelets to monkeys, transfer their “right to vote” in state elections to nature‑conservationists like himself, and these representatives of animal life rights ensure that states act in the common (not only human) interest. Is this possible? The unrealistic nature of nature‑conservation demands will inevitably lead people (obeying their biological nature) to prefer their own interests and abandon nature protection altogether. This does not stop nativists. “Supporters of environmental ethics are often criticized for the impracticality of most of their proposals. … One must not forget that ‘forced’ and ‘ethical’ are by no means synonyms. Ethics is the science of the proper, not of the existent” (V. E. Boreiko, 2004). Calling a person to act against his nature is a way to provoke a psychological conflict that will lead to the rejection of the values underlying such demands. Attempts to require actions that contradict human nature are doomed to fail. Unfeasible demands lead to labeling “deviants” for their non‑conformity to high standards; the real interests of nature protection recede to the background and ultimately are simply forgotten. “The main source of the ecological crisis is moral looseness” (V. E. Boreiko, 2004). From our point of view, the cause of the crisis is that rapidly evolving humanity has already moved to a new level of population and technological capabilities, and the associated shift in living conditions should lead to a change in relations with the environment. Even if we reject the unfeasible demands of nativism as propagandistic, we must acknowledge that it is unsuitable as a basis for nature‑conservation activity. Nativism treats each “wild nature” object as an absolute value. Absolute values cannot be compared, yet nature‑conservation activity requires comparison. For which species and populations should the main efforts be applied? Which losses of natural biosystems should be considered acceptable? In a changing world and degrading ecosystems, which objects should receive the main conservation effort? The utilitarian approach knows no such difficulties: it can assess benefit (resource cost) in comparable units and make a corresponding choice. Thus, nativism is irrational in its principles, contradicts the biological nature of humans, and cannot serve as a basis for everyday nature‑conservation activity. Comprehensive concepts. After the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the concept of sustainable development gained wide acceptance. It is a compromise between the egoism of utilitarianism and the non‑constructiveness of nativism. Sustainable (more accurate translations—non‑depleting, restorative, supportive) development is the satisfaction of the needs of the present generation without limiting the possibilities of future generations, both in terms of the resources they will need and in their potential freedom, quality, and ethical life. The idea of sustainable development contains a reference precisely to the value that can limit our egoism—care for future generations. Our biological nature, like that of any other species, was formed through the optimization of two closely linked tasks—our survival and leaving successful offspring. Absolute and relative ethics. The possibility of assessing the ethical (or unethical) nature of an action arises in a situation where a choice exists. For example, it is meaningless to determine whether it is ethical or unethical that a human is an animal—we have no alternative but to be who we are. However, one can ask whether it was ethical to build a navigation canal through the absolutely protected core of the Danube Biosphere Reserve, since the state authorities and the individuals involved had the possibility to choose various alternative solutions. All objects possessing ethical value cannot be preserved. Humanity’s existence is linked to resource use, environmental alteration, and the destruction of living objects. A selection procedure for optimal protection objects is needed. In fact this means that different courses of action, which differ in that some objects are lost while others are saved, must be compared. If any of these possible courses leads to the loss of valuable objects, can any of them be considered ethical? Absolutely ethical actions (e.g., saving everything) or absolutely unethical actions (total destruction) lie beyond human capabilities. They define only certain ethical poles, between which lie the actions actually performed by people. In a situation of ethical conflict (when every course of action entails certain losses) an ethically flawless action is impossible; any decision represents a compromise. Whether it is ethical or not can be determined only by comparing it with all possible alternatives. It should be noted that any decision made under ethical conflict represents a certain misfortune, imposing a heavy ethical burden.What is preferable in severe childbirth: to perform actions that threaten the mother’s life but preserve a chance of the child’s survival, or to sacrifice the newborn’s life? If a nation within its own territory carries out actions that lead to the death of its citizens, what is preferable: to respect the nations’ right to self‑determination or the people’s right to life? And if assistance to the oppressed requires sacrifices on the part of the helpers? Leaving aside the discussion of social examples, we must acknowledge that our relations with the environment are almost always actions carried out under conditions of ethical conflict. Foundations of Rational Conservation Ethics (RCE). Which ethics will be suitable for making a justified choice in the context of an ethical conflict? It still needs to be developed. Some ideas of such ethics have been proposed and published by the authors of this textbook under the name rational conservation ethics (RCE). The task of RCE is to develop a basis for comparing the grounds for protecting various objects. It should not replace the innate ethical qualities of a person, but provide a rational foundation for their formalized application. This approach can be seen as an attempt to apply the concept of sustainable development, accepted by the international community, to the field of conservation ethics. To determine the optimal (damage‑minimizing) nature‑conservation strategy, it is necessary to compare potential conservation objects. From the RCE perspective, the grounds for protecting any object can be two groups of reasons: its actual or potential usefulness (which can be expressed through its economic value) and ethical reasons related to moral duty (expressed through its ethical value). Today humanity is much better at evaluating and comparing the monetary value of objects than their ethical value. Without intruding into the sphere of natural‑resource economics (a separate branch of knowledge and activity with its own set of methods), let us discuss possible methods for assessing and comparing ethical value. To compare ethical values, we must first establish which objects we consider valuable. The first natural mechanism of our psyche is the awareness of the value of something unique, irreplaceable. Yet each moment of our fleeting life is also unique. Feeling its uniqueness, however, it is meaningless to try to stop it. Besides uniqueness, a second reason for recognizing the value of an object is the situation in which it may cease to exist, or may persist for a more or less extended period. Thus, for us, value belongs to objects that are potentially long‑lived or potentially immortal. The need to protect them is linked to their vulnerability. Causes of object uniqueness. Any more or less complex object is, strictly speaking, non‑reproducible. Any coin has a certain unique set of crystal‑lattice defects in its structure, a distribution of contaminant molecules, a unique set of micro‑scratches and damages. Does such non‑reproducibility make the coin ethically valuable to us? In general, no. However, the coin has monetary value. This value is determined by the costs required to obtain another identical coin. The monetary value of a coin is closely linked to its potential usefulness. Can a coin be ethically valuable? Yes. Here are two of many possible examples. A coin of a vanished state, reflecting a unique stage of human history, can be valuable. A coin that saved its owner’s life by stopping a bullet that happened to strike it can be valuable. The loss of such a coin is a wrongful act whose consequences cannot be reduced to the cost of obtaining a duplicate. How does the first‑type non‑reproducibility (random, not valuable to us) differ from the second‑type non‑reproducibility (meaningful, valuable)? Every object is the result of its prehistory. Let us divide the factors influencing the formation of an object into three groups: — stochastic (Greek stochasis — guess) — random, chaotic; — deterministic (Latin determinare — limit, define) — predictable, law‑governed; — emergent (Latin emergere — arise, appear) — caused by the inseparable interaction of parts of a developing system. The consequences of stochastic factors are non‑reproducible but not valuable. The consequences of deterministic influences are reproducible and provide a basis for protection from a utilitarian viewpoint. Emergent properties are unique and confer ethical value on the object. This approach applies both to living and non‑living, to natural and artificial objects. Coins in a single batch differ from each other stochastically. Their main features and denomination are determined deterministically. If a coin reflects a unique historical stage or a person’s life, such emergent features give it ethical value. Imagining changes in the state of objects as their trajectories in a certain phase space, we see that deterministic factors define the main trajectories of change along which movement occurs in that space. Stochastic factors introduce a noise—random deviations of the trajectory. In the simplest case no new quality emerges from the interaction of these groups of factors: the object reaches the “destination” with larger or smaller deviations. However, when the system reaches a critical level of complexity, the interaction of deterministic and stochastic processes can generate emergent qualities. In phase space this may appear as special zones where a small deviation of an object’s trajectory can cause unpredictable consequences. Stochastic deviations in this case are not cancelled but lead to the emergence of a previously unpredictable system state. For example, the structure of the human brain is determined by genetics and life experience, including learning. Random events of prior life and quantum effects at the atomic level can make a person’s decision‑making process in a given situation not fully predictable. Knowing all the prerequisites, we could still only determine the probability of a particular human action, not predict its result unequivocally. And if a person’s choice is part of a complex of actions, an emergent result of such uncertainty may be a brilliant insight or a simple logical error. Differences among organisms within a population reflect the influence not only of stochastic (gene recombination) and deterministic (age, sex, etc.) factors, but also emergent processes (the formation of a unique individual during ontogeny). If ontogeny were an automatic unfolding of genetic information, it would have no ethical value. However, the result of individual development depends on unpredictable epigenetic interactions (see item 5.26). We know only two groups of processes in which ethically valuable (emergent) uniqueness develops: the development of complex systems and human creativity. The first group (“natural creativity”) is diverse. It includes: individual development (ontogeny); ecosystem development (succession and phyto‑cenogenesis); biosphere development and the evolution of life (phylogenesis); formation of a human personality. Human creativity manifests in the development of culture and society. Emergent processes determine the uniqueness of both the individual and the species to which it belongs. Comparing them shows that the potential immortality of objects influences their value. Destroying an individual causes less damage than destroying a species, because a species is potentially immortal. Yet even a mortal object can possess significant ethical value. An individual of a rare species is more valuable than one of a common species, because its loss more strongly affects the species’ survival chances. The value of an individual is also linked to its contribution to the next generation. In humans, a potentially immortal, culturally unique personality is formed. Thus, the basis for recognizing the ethical value of a given object can be its emergent uniqueness and potential immortality. The presented examples should not give the reader the impression that a concept is being offered to decide which people have the right to life and which do not. In addition to conservation ethics, other principles regulate human‑to‑human interactions. Nevertheless, for example, medical practice involves various efforts to preserve the health of different people. Most of us consider protecting children’s health more important than caring for adults, and protecting motherhood more important than protecting fatherhood. Civilian casualties, especially children and women, in armed conflict are regarded as more tragic than the loss of soldiers. Thus, even regarding people we intuitively apply some principles that allow us to compare their relative value. Consequently, these principles must be understood, and the conservation ethics we are developing should not conflict with them. Components of evaluating the grounds for protecting certain objects. How to determine which object needs protection before others? For instance, when forming the natural‑reserve fund, the best approach is to invite a recognized and competent specialist. The specialist will indicate which ecosystems are common, which are irretrievably lost, and which are the best candidates for preservation (both in terms of their uniqueness and their interaction with other existing objects and their integration into a single complex). What if there is no recognized authority and the opinions of available experts diverge? One should try to determine which parameters an ideal specialist would monitor, obtain assessments of these parameters with the accuracy possible in the given situation, and attempt to compare possible courses of action using these assessments. From the RCE perspective, it is necessary to obtain estimates of the actual and potential cost of the compared objects, measures of their uniqueness, and measures of their potential immortality. In addition, to determine the priority of conservation objects, it is necessary to assess the danger threatening these objects, as well as the expected cost and effectiveness of conservation measures. Compared courses of action should be evaluated not only by their direct effect (change in cost and value of potential conservation objects) but also by their indirect impact on other objects (increase or decrease of their cost and value). In general, the relationship between the main parameters can be expressed by the following conditional formula: [IMG_1] The very need to protect a particular object is a consequence of some danger threatening its existence. In the overwhelming majority of cases, protection cannot completely eliminate the threat of the object’s loss, but only reduces its probability. The effectiveness of protection can be assessed as the reduction in the probability of the object’s loss due to conservation measures. The uniqueness of an object can be assessed by determining the probability of the emergence of an analogue identical to the given object in the properties essential to us. A measure of an object’s potential immortality may be the probable duration of its existence in the case that it is preserved in the short‑term perspective (the period for which conservation measures are planned). The presented approach combines economic grounds for protecting objects with a formalized assessment of their ethical value. In addition to two economic assessments (the object’s cost, i.e., the possible benefit derived from its existence, and the cost of conservation measures, which require economists), the formula uses probabilistic quantities related to the features of emergence and loss of protected objects. Estimating such probabilities should be the task of specialists studying the given category of systems. It can be performed based on statistical processing of empirical data describing the fate of analogous objects, as well as on modeling results of the corresponding natural systems. Practical application of the presented approach requires evaluating many parameters and constitutes a fairly complex research task. Fortunately, even solving particular questions (probability of emergence of certain objects; their probable lifespan, etc.) is of independent interest. What is needed for the development of the views presented here? The search for methods of formalized assessment and comparison of the parameters used in decision‑making. Practical experience of application in some initially narrow field. Discussion of these ideas and their comparison with possible alternatives. The practice of discussing the views expressed in this section shows their acute controversy. In any case, the authors hope that the discussion they have initiated of the issues raised here will contribute to more conscious conservation activity. 6.22. (supplement) Should we fear GM products? D. Shabanov, M. Kravchenko. Ecology: the biology of interaction Chapter 6. Human ecology and nature protection 6.24. Eco‑conversion