An Unpublished Column. On Violence: A Simple Ethical Problem and Analysis of Three Examples from Contemporary Ukrainian Life

← Dmytro Shabanov → On the Nature of Male and Female, or from Conjugation to Oogamy An Unpublished Column. On Violence: A Simple Ethical Problem and Analysis of Three Examples from Contemporary Ukrainian Life A Political Fragment of the Final Column Column for Computerra #138 Columns for Computerra ​ Ukraine is passing through the harshest trials in its recent history, which provoke heated debate. Of course, mutual misunderstanding between opponents is compounded by the effects of disinformation. One who sympathises with the anti-criminal character of the Ukrainian revolution will find no common ground with a victim of propaganda who believes that fascists and looters stood on the Maidan. But there are other reasons as well. I wish to discuss one important question that polarises those who argue about recent events. To make my logic clearer, I will begin by formulating an ethical problem, if I may. Scenario 1. Citizens N, O, P, and R joined together as a group to achieve certain goals, armed themselves with bladed or firearms, and used force against other persons. Scenario 2. State structure S, in order to achieve certain goals, organised a group of civilians, armed them with bladed or firearms, and supported their use of force against other persons. Question. Are there situations in which the use of violence corresponding to Scenario 1 is permissible? To Scenario 2? Are these situations symmetrical from an ethical standpoint? In the course of discussing this problem, I encountered a variety of responses that can be reduced to three groups. Answer No. 1. No, never. No, never. The situations are symmetrical. The end does not justify the means, and the use of violence outside the law is never permissible. Answer No. 2. No, never. Yes, sometimes. The situations are asymmetrical. The state holds a monopoly on the use of violence, and outside the will of the state citizens have no such right. But if for the state (which represents all citizens) or its structures the use of violence is necessary, it must be applied in the form that allows the set task to be solved most effectively. Answer No. 3. Yes, sometimes. No, never. The situations are asymmetrical. If the goals of citizens are worthy and cannot be achieved by other means, violence on the part of citizens may be justified. The right to use violence has been granted to the state by citizens; so that the state does not usurp it, this right is constrained by strict procedures. Stepping outside these strict procedures constitutes a usurpation of power. Which answer is yours? Mine is the third. Incidentally, the countries that live in accordance with it have achieved the greatest success both in standard of living and in the level of civil liberties. Is it possible to prove that Answer No. 3 is correct? Within my own frame of reference — yes. Whether this proof will hold within yours — I do not know. It is easier to justify why the third answer, rather than the first, is correct by means of examples. If citizens have organised themselves to repel terrorists seeking to kill hostages (or, for instance, provocateurs who want their own looting attributed to another political faction), their actions deserve every approval. If they oppose a state that is usurping power, their actions correspond to the right of citizens to revolt — provided that stopping the usurpation by other means was not possible. If they are seeking justice against the criminal authorities in Vradvika, and there is no other way to do so — they are right. If they oppose a state that has ignored a peaceful protest for two months and responded to the demands of half the country's citizens only with sadistic, unlawful use of force — they are right. Answer No. 2 corresponds to the common principle that "the boss is always right." If the state departs from the procedures limiting the use of violence, it is pursuing its own interests rather than protecting those of citizens. This ends in a complete loss of legitimacy for the state and a rightless condition for its citizens. Now I wish to consider three examples. The first example is the most pressing of those I have cited: the one that relates to the Maidan. The participants in the anti-criminal revolution did indeed use violence. As far as I can tell, footage of such use of force is well known to all viewers — both those who attempted to form an unbiased picture of events and those who have been fed by the Russian propaganda machine. Could the participants in the anti-criminal protest have done without violence and been heard? No, and the course of events made that abundantly clear. Was violence always the minimum necessary? Probably not. The use of violence has its own logic. Once escalation began, superhuman restraint was required to stop it. Fortunately, my fellow citizens frequently demonstrated precisely this quality. And sometimes, of course, they could not manage it... But, you understand, in discussing these cases one must go into detail, weighing whether the parties truly could have acted more optimally. Now you will understand my attitude toward the common argument against the Maidan: "just let them try to organise something similar in Germany or America — they would be arrested immediately." Of course they would. And do you know why? In both Germany and America, politicians simply cannot ignore peaceful protest actions supported by half the population. And to punish security forces for excessive use of force, one need not build barricades there — it is enough to go to court. And in such conditions, where just goals can be achieved without violence, suppression of violence will be justified. Now I propose to consider the second example — one simple case from Kharkiv life. Compared with the events in Kyiv it will seem a minor matter. It was on 18 February, the day when special units of the Ukrainian state burned (or at least took no measures to save) the Trade Unions House, where the wounded burned alive. On that same day it became known that the Interior Ministry was using internal troops as cover for legal and illegal special forces, which led to casualties among the Internal Troops. A call spread on social media to blockade the exit from the Kharkiv Academy of Internal Troops, whose cadets had received orders to proceed to Kyiv. Among other acquaintances of mine, two young women I work with — each weighing perhaps 45–50 kilograms — went there. I intended to finish my affairs at the university and go to the Academy to keep an eye on them and pull them away if the situation became dangerous. I did not manage to leave in time. One of them came back, and the second apparently also planned to leave the rally shortly. Information appeared online that the cadets would not be going anywhere. I calmed down somewhat and went home with my wife (she is due to give birth in a month). I arrived and learned that I had calmed down prematurely. The protesters were standing outside the Academy of Internal Troops, chanting "Stay home!" The Berkut pushed them to the other side of the street. And then — if you do not believe it, watch the video — the following occurred. On the side of the street opposite the Interior Ministry Academy stood the protesters. Behind the line of police there appeared several dozen civilians in yellow-green vests carrying sticks. They removed the items that the protesters had brought to the academy gates, approached the line of police officers, passed through their ranks... and began beating the rally participants with sticks. The police stood and watched... When the protesters had been dispersed, the people in vests calmly gathered and went on their way. Who are these people in vests? The Kharkiv governor explained. They are "angels" from the civic organisation "Ukrainian Front," established on his initiative and that of the mayor. A whole range of specific tasks in the Kharkiv region has been carried out by the hands of such "civic activists," and this began some time ago. If you are interested, see my article from 2010. At that time I had to write about "men in black" or "municipal security." This is something that many of my colleagues witnessed with their own eyes. And after that I believe the reports from Kyiv about how gangs organised by the police ransacked the city and even shot citizens. Do you think the Kharkiv governor and the Kharkiv mayor retain their legitimacy after these events? Now I propose to consider the third example: one of many aspects of the Kyiv events. I will quote the statement of the Kharkiv Human Rights Group. "On 20 February 2014, in the centre of Kyiv, what amounted to a terrorist operation took place <...> Snipers using firearms specially designed to engage targets at long range, from pre-prepared firing positions, killed dozens of unarmed people on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti. The snipers' aim was precisely to kill people <...> The events of this terrible crime were broadcast live on many television channels for several hours, but none of the entities authorised to combat terrorism took measures to immediately halt the terrorist operation against the citizens of Ukraine. We are therefore certain that this crime could only have been carried out by a special unit of one of the special security services." According to credible claims, these snipers also fired on law enforcement officers. Allegedly, when one of the special units identified the snipers' positions, it was forbidden ("from the very top") to touch them. The Maidan participants are convinced that the snipers were seconded from Russia. Sources within the police allegedly assert that they were their own, "homegrown" special services. And do you know how the Russian public reacted, having consumed Kremlin agitprop? Having watched the news about Kyiv drenched in blood on Yanukovych's orders, Ukrainian-born Russian cultural figures — the Lanovys and Kobzons — called on Yanukovych to use force. Such is their culture... Yes, there is also the version that the Maidan activists organised the snipers themselves. As far as I can tell, for Russian and pro-Russian propaganda this is the principal version. As you have understood, to refute it the argument advanced by the human rights defenders is sufficient. Now also consider that the snipers were positioned in the most heavily guarded government buildings. That they used professional weapons. And, finally, the last argument. Fragments of a text by an unknown author circulating on Facebook. "Provocateurs dressed in 'Berkut' uniforms and are shooting at protesters, NTV reports. Provocateurs dressed in traffic police uniforms and take bribes. Provocateurs dressed in police uniforms and raped a girl in Vradiyivka. <...> A provocateur dressed in the uniform of the president and rules Ukraine..." Of course, the turning point in the situation was connected with the snipers' work. By every rule, people should have fled. Instead they moved and continued moving toward the place where they might be killed. Medical workers faced particular danger: the snipers shot at red crosses. New volunteers put on the crosses and went to pull out the wounded... Yanukovych at that time was conferring with the foreign ministers of three European states — not counting the time when he went off to call Putin while the ambassadors patiently awaited his return. Responsibility for ending the bloodshed was assumed by the Rada (Verkhovna Rada), through the efforts of the opposition and some deputies from the Party of Regions (the "party of the bosses"). The only parliamentary force that did not cast a single vote to end the shooting was the Communists. Even after these decisions, the presidential administration attempted to move special units and threatened the use of force. Tell me, did the president forfeit his legitimacy as a result of the events I have described, or not? I am writing this column on Saturday the 22nd. The Kharkiv governor is convening a congress of deputies from the South-East of Ukraine and Crimea. Allegedly, more or less veiled decisions about the separation of part of Ukraine are to be expected. For the residents of that part of the country, this is a road to nowhere. What is to be done? I am finishing my work and going to the Kharkiv Maidan... P.S. In the time during which I did not know whether I would publish this column in some outlet or not, significant changes occurred. I did go to the Kharkiv Maidan, and returned elated — as it turned out, prematurely. However, the fact that attempts to detach Kharkiv from Ukraine have so far not been made is very important to me. Regarding the ethical problem I discussed, nothing has changed and is unlikely to change. But in the perception of the specific examples I discussed, changes have occurred. First example. The Maidan won. Now other tasks are on the agenda (I have already tried to reason about them). It will be very painful if all the energy dissipates into nothing and the main achievement of the revolution turns out to be a change of personnel, the replacement of the language law, and toppled monuments. Secondary and subordinate goals must not overshadow the strategic tasks. Second example. There is as yet no clear consensus on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Kharkiv governor and the Kharkiv mayor. At the moment I write this, Kernes and Dobkin, despite the Rada's decision to arrest them, are rallying with their supporters in the city centre. They are greeted with enthusiastic cheers. A significant portion of the citizenry presumably supports them. What is to be done? Do not panic. The main thing is that Kharkiv remains part of Ukraine. It is quite likely that if the majority of citizens support a criminal city government, Kharkiv will remain under a criminal city government (though the governor can, of course, be removed). An attempt to reverse the situation by force will lead to nothing good. Force would need to be applied in the case of irreversible decisions (secession from Ukraine; a call for the entry of Russian troops). Now it is necessary to demonstrate that Ukraine has a government capable of establishing the normal development of the country. Now it is necessary not to allow Kernes to organise provocations against citizens (odds-on he is right now planning what outrage to commit so that it can be blamed on "Banderites"). The supporters of the anti-criminal revolution must persuade people. If the "Ukrainian project" succeeds — Kernes will dissolve like a bad dream. If the revolution does not achieve its goals, the retention of Kernes and Dobkin will be far from the most sorrowful consequence of that catastrophe. Audits of our mayor's activities (such as expenditure on the metro) can help Kharkiv residents open their eyes to their chosen representative. After all, the central government has a great deal of influence. Third example. Here everything turned out to be straightforward. Even Yanukovych's closest supporters abandoned him. Look at how his closest ally, the head of the Party of Regions faction in parliament, Oleksandr Yefremov, accuses him of the tragedy that occurred. One of the reasons the former president so evidently lost legitimacy was precisely the use of snipers. The most sorrowful thing is that during the funerals of fallen citizens in our country people are capable of shouting "Glory to the Berkut." A disgrace... Well then, life goes on. We shall see how the perception of the examples I discussed changes over time. P.P.S. I had offered this column to "Yezhednevny Zhurnal." After its editor informed me that he would not be able to publish it, I posted it here (slightly edited and with a postscript added). However, the following day, when I visited the EZh website, I was surprised to find the previous version of this text there. ← Dmytro Shabanov → On the Nature of Male and Female, or from Conjugation to Oogamy An Unpublished Column. On Violence: A Simple Ethical Problem and Analysis of Three Examples from Contemporary Ukrainian Life A Political Fragment of the Final Column Column for Computerra #138 Columns for Computerra ​