Ecology: biology of interaction. VI-20. (supplement) Principles of rational ecological ethics

VI-20. (addendum) Principles of Rational Conservation Ethics If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am only for myself, what am I? If not now, when? Rabbi Hillel When the scope of ethics expands to include not only human-generated values but also values created by the environment, then we can truly become optimists about the future of humanity. Eugene Odum Humanity is at a critical juncture in its history. Each of us plays a part, to some extent, in choosing the future trajectory of development. It is clear to all of us that a future with a free and happy humanity and a stable biosphere is far better than a future where civilization collapses in a devastated environment. It is much less clear how each of us should act to promote the former scenario and counteract the latter. We need to change the principles by which we make decisions concerning our environment, the biosphere as a whole, and individual organisms or resources. These decisions should concern both our daily lives and our activities as citizens (in choosing a state's development strategy) or professionals (in our professional activities). It is clear that it would be good to return the biosphere to its "original" state or at least to preserve all its remaining elements in their current state: all natural ecosystems, all diverse species, all unique organisms, all unspent resources. Unfortunately, such a wish is a utopia. Humanity continues to grow and requires significant resources to sustain its existence. A sharp reduction in our species' population due to one catastrophe or another will lead not to the preservation of the environment, but to its destruction. At best, we will only be able to preserve something, and we will have to sacrifice something. How do we determine what individuals and humanity as a whole should protect (at the cost of more or less significant expenses and sacrifices), and what they can transform and use? Any human action is a choice. The outcome of a choice is influenced by three groups of factors: biological, ethical, and rational. The biological foundations of our behavior were laid when our species or its predecessors could not significantly alter their living environment. Despite the rapid growth of the human population and its environmental modification capabilities, human biological nature remains relatively unchanged. Ethical factors are culturally determined. In broad terms, they were shaped during an era when humanity was divided into local groups fiercely competing with each other for resources. The third group of factors is related to reason, which allows us to predict some of the consequences of the choices humans make. The rational part of our behavior is the most variable, and adaptation to the environment occurs primarily through it. We cannot change the biological basis of our behavior, but we can influence its culturally determined mechanisms. By developing our capacity for rational prediction (improving forecasting methods, modeling, and science in general), we must also change our ethics—the system of values and rules that define our course of action. Humanity will reach the desired state when the vast majority of people consider actions that lead to a sustainable future to be moral, and actions that hinder the achievement of this goal to be immoral. In modern language, the concepts of ethics and morality are close and often interchangeable. We are closer to the idea that distinguishes these concepts. Thus, ethics is the science of morality, its fundamental principles. Morality (from Latin. moralis - moral) is a set of culturally determined norms that define which actions are socially approved, proper, and correct. Morality defines both relationships between people (subject-subject relations) and the actions of subjects towards objects. If we recognize that some actions towards natural objects are right and some are wrong, we apply moral judgments to them. These judgments must be based on some foundation determined by ethics. The concept of "ethics" (Greek. ethos - custom, character) was introduced by Aristotle to characterize human qualities that determine his virtues. Ethics establishes the structure of values, ideals, and basic aspirations on which moral norms are based. Principles describing the interaction of individuals and humanity as a whole with the biosphere also belong to the sphere of ethics. This part of it can be called conservation ethics. The term "ecological ethics" is most often used in this sense, but it is, firstly, less accurate, and secondly, it has become closely associated with a certain circle of ideas. Conservation ethics can ensure humanity's survival only if it corresponds to our biological nature and relies on our reason. We must clearly understand what and why we must protect, and for what purpose we will have to impose self-restraints. These self-restraints must be acceptable to our biological essence. Can an effective conservation ethics be built on fundamentally new principles for humanity? Probably not, as in this case, it will not correspond to our nature. Can it be arbitrary, dependent on whims ("we will take care of giant pandas because they are cute, and we will not protect other bears because they are less attractive")? No, such an approach will make our actions irrational and will not allow us to effectively achieve our goals. Therefore, to build conservation ethics, it is necessary to understand what reasons can make the protection of a particular object important, choose a sufficient but not excessive set of reasons for protection, and learn to evaluate it with arguments. All possible grounds for protecting a particular object can be divided into two groups of reasons: those related to benefit (utilitarian) and those related to moral reasons, moral duty (ethical). The expression of utilitarian reasons is economic value, actual or potential; the expression of ethical reasons is ethical value. Let's consider the simplest example. Why should sturgeon be protected? Arguments related to benefit may include: because sturgeon provide nutritious and delicate food; because the trade in beluga caviar and sturgeon can replenish the budget; because sturgeon are important for the self-regulation of water bodies; because valuable medicines may be derived from them in the future, etc. And also because sturgeon are an amazing group of fish, without which the Earth's fauna would be impoverished; they are alive and can be sympathized with; now is a critical moment in their history, and if they are preserved now, this group can exist in the immeasurable future. The second group of explanations concerns the value, the uniqueness of possible objects of protection. Explanations appealing to benefit (value) and value are not reducible to each other. Thus, methods for selecting objects for conservation activities can be divided into three groups: utilitarian (oriented primarily towards value in one form or another), nature-centered (oriented primarily towards ethical value), and comprehensive (taking both into account). Let's consider them in more detail. Utilitarianism (anthropocentrism). The ethical component in utilitarian concepts is quite simple: what is ethical is what is beneficial to humans. If a resource can be spent beneficially, it is bad to spend it without benefit. If by spending a resource not too quickly, we can consume more of it in total, then we should not rush. Utilitarianism, by its nature, is oriented towards obtaining benefit for humans themselves. One of its forms is the concept of rational use of natural resources, widespread in post-Soviet countries. Unfortunately, the experience of applying the utilitarian approach has systematically led to the loss of natural objects that were assessed as unimportant for obtaining benefits. To fully assess the benefit of a particular object, one must possess complete knowledge of all interconnections of all objects, which is unattainable. The pursuit of profit, characteristic of the utilitarian approach to our environment, contradicts our natural (biologically determined) perception of the natural environment as a value independent of us. Both individuals and societies that pursue only their own benefit are perceived by us as morally deficient. Unfortunately, the utilitarian worldview leads to a characteristic narrowing of consciousness, where what is not beneficial becomes uninteresting. The current ecological crisis is largely a consequence of the utilitarian attitude towards environmental protection. It does not follow from the above that the possible benefits from natural resources should not be considered, but, in our opinion, the limitations of such an approach must be recognized. However, the utilitarian approach has become quite habitual for most of our fellow citizens. It still prevails in educational literature and is actively used in teaching when explaining the practical and economic value of certain living organisms. A school textbook writes: "Animals are a source of food for humans, as well as raw materials for industry" (Yu.G. Vervets et al., 1997). Deviating from the topic, let us note that the study of zoology will become fascinating for schoolchildren when they begin to study animals not as something useful, but as our amazing relatives who evoke lively interest and sympathy outside of practical benefit considerations. Nature-centeredness. The opposite of utilitarianism is nature-centeredness, which places the interests of "wild nature" above human interests. The well-known propagandist of "ecological ethics," V. Ye. Boreiko, lists the following reasons for nature conservation: The protection of wild nature is a good deed in itself and an act of benevolence; wild nature has intrinsic value and interests and does not need justification from elsewhere; it is a despised minority and has natural rights to freedom and existence; it is a fundamentally different entity from humans and a sacred space; it is a global and interspecies heritage; it was created by God; not only humans but also wild nature are subject to salvation; all life is sacred; it is indecent to profit from the suffering of other beings; the protection of wild nature is an expression of our love, respect, admiration, reverence, and awe; it (protection) is an act of benevolence and advocacy and God's work; it is an expression of our empathy, pity, compassion, generosity, kindness, and gratitude; it is the protection of an independent state; it is our duty, obligation, and moral responsibility; it is important from the perspective of justice; it is the protection of absolute beauty or good and the redemption of human fall; humans should be ashamed of the destruction of wild nature (based on V. Ye. Boreiko, 2004). The list of reasons provided is very telling. A significant part of them are simply repetitions in different forms of the conclusion that actually needs justification. For a person who does not share these beliefs, such a statement will have no persuasive force. Another group of arguments appeals to divine will. People with different religious views, as well as those who are free from them, will not be able to use arguments based on one sacred commandment or another as universally convincing. Finally, some of the listed arguments are based on transferring ideas taken out of context to natural objects: rights, an independent state, a political minority, religious salvation. "...in order for politicians to pay more attention to nature conservation, it is necessary to give animals (representatives of chordates), as the most intelligent and sensitive creatures on Earth after humans, the right to choose" (V. Ye. Boreiko, 2006). According to Boreiko, various chordates, from lancelets to apes, transfer their "right to vote" in state elections to conservationists like himself, and these representatives of animal rights ensure the functioning of states in common (not just human) interests. Is this possible? The unreality of conservation demands will inevitably lead to people (obeying their biological nature) prioritizing their own interests and completely abandoning nature conservation. This does not stop nature-centered proponents. "Proponents of ecological ethics are often criticized that most of their proposals are impossible. <...> It should not be forgotten that 'forced' and 'ethical' are by no means synonyms. Ethics is the science of what ought to be, not of what is" (V. Ye. Boreiko, 2004). Calling humans to do what contradicts their nature is a way to provoke psychological conflict, which will lead to the rejection of the values that dictate such demands. In other words, an attempt to demand actions from people that contradict their nature is doomed to failure. Demands that cannot be met lead to the need to stigmatize "apostates" for their non-compliance with high standards; real environmental protection interests recede into the background and are eventually simply forgotten. "The main source of the ecological crisis is moral depravity" (V. Ye. Boreiko, 2004). In our opinion, the cause of the crisis (catastrophe?) is that rapidly evolving humanity has already moved to a new level of population and technological capabilities, and the associated change in living conditions must lead to a change in relations with the environment. Even if we abandon the unattainable demands of nature-centeredness, considering them as propaganda, we must admit that it is unsuitable as a basis for conservation activities. Nature-centeredness considers every object of wild nature as an absolute value. Absolute values cannot be compared, but environmental conservation activities require their comparison. For the preservation of which species and populations should the main efforts be directed? What losses of natural biosystems should be considered acceptable? In a changing world with collapsing ecosystems, on what objects should the main efforts be focused for preservation? The utilitarian approach does not present such difficulties: it allows for the assessment of benefit (resource value) in comparable units and making an appropriate choice. Thus, nature-centeredness is irrational in its principles, contradicts human biological nature, and cannot be the basis for everyday conservation activities. Comprehensive concepts. After the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), the concept of sustainable development (in more detail in section 6.14) has become widespread. This concept can be considered a compromise between the egoism of utilitarianism and the unconstructiveness of nature-centeredness. Sustainable development (more accurate translations in terms of meaning are: non-depleting, regenerative, supportive) is the satisfaction of the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, both in terms of the resources they will need and in their potential freedom and ethical life. The idea of sustainable development is based on a value that can limit our egoism—concern for future generations. Our biological nature, like the nature of any other species, arose from the optimization of two closely related tasks—our survival and leaving successful offspring. Absolute and relative ethics. The possibility of evaluating the ethical (or unethical) nature of any action arises when there is a choice. For example, it is pointless to determine whether it is ethical or unethical that humans are animals—we have no other choice but to be what we are. However, one can answer whether it was ethical to build a navigable canal through the absolutely protected core of the Danube Biosphere Reserve, as the state bodies and individuals involved in this decision had the opportunity to choose various alternative solutions. It is impossible to preserve all objects that have ethical value. The existence of humanity is linked to the use of resources, environmental modification, and the destruction of living objects. Our existence requires a procedure for selecting optimal objects for protection. In fact, this means that we need to compare two or more different courses of action that differ in that some objects are lost as a result, while others are preserved. If any of these possible courses of action lead to the loss of some valuable objects, can any of them be considered ethical? Absolutely ethical (e.g., saving all existence) or absolutely unethical (total destruction) actions are beyond human capabilities. They only define certain ethical poles, between which lie the actions that people actually perform. In a situation of ethical conflict (where any course of action leads to certain losses), ethically impeccable action is impossible; any decision is a compromise. Whether this compromise is ethical can only be determined by comparing it with all possible alternatives. It should be noted that any decision-making in conditions of ethical conflict is a misfortune, imposing a heavy ethical burden. What is better in difficult childbirth: to take actions that threaten the life of the mother but preserve the chance of the child's survival, or to sacrifice the life of the newborn? Whichever decision is made in such a situation, the necessity of making it is a heavy burden. Decisions requiring a choice between different values are quite common. If a nation, within its territory, takes actions that lead to the death of citizens, what is better: to respect the right of nations to self-determination or the right of people to life? And what if helping the oppressed requires sacrifices from those who help? Avoiding discussion of social examples, it must be acknowledged that our relationship with the environment almost always turns out to be actions taken in conditions of ethical conflict. Foundations of RCE. What ethics will be suitable for making informed choices in conditions of ethical conflict? It still needs to be developed. Some ideas for such ethics have been proposed and published by the authors of this textbook under the name of rational conservation ethics (RCE). The task of RCE is to develop a basis for comparing the grounds for protecting different objects. It should not replace humans' innate ethical qualities but should provide a rational basis for their formalized application. This approach can be considered an attempt to apply the concept of sustainable development adopted by the international community in the field of conservation ethics. To determine the optimal (harm-minimizing) environmental protection strategy, it is necessary to compare potential objects of protection. From the perspective of RCE, the grounds for protecting any object can be two groups of reasons: its actual or potential usefulness (which can be expressed through its economic value) and ethical grounds related to moral duty for its protection (which are expressed through its ethical value). Today, humanity is much better at assessing and comparing the value of objects than their worth. Without interfering in the sphere of environmental economics (a separate field of knowledge and activity with its own set of methods), let's discuss possible methods for assessing and comparing ethical value. To compare ethical values, we must first establish which objects we consider valuable. The first natural mechanism for our psyche is the awareness of the value of something unique. But every moment of our fleeting life is also unique. Feeling its uniqueness, it is pointless to try to stop it. In addition to uniqueness, the second reason for recognizing the value of any object is the situation where it may cease to exist, or it may survive for a more or less extended period. Therefore, objects that are potentially long-lasting or potentially immortal have value for us. The need for their protection is related to their uniqueness and vulnerability, to the possibility of their preservation, which depends on our actions. Reasons for the uniqueness of objects. Every more or less complex object, strictly speaking, is unique. Any coin has some unique complex of crystal lattice defects in its structure, distribution of pollutant molecules within it, a unique complex of micro-scratches and damage. Does such uniqueness of a coin make it ethically valuable to us? Generally, no. Instead, a coin has value. This value is determined by the costs that must be incurred to obtain another identical coin. The value of a coin is closely related to its potential benefit. But can a coin be ethically valuable? Yes. Let's give two of many possible examples. A coin from a vanished state, reflecting a unique stage of human history, can be valuable. A coin that saved its owner's life by stopping a bullet that accidentally hit it can be valuable. The loss of such a coin is a wrong act, the consequences of which cannot be reduced to the cost of obtaining a duplicate. How does the first type of uniqueness (accidental, not valuable to us) differ from the second type of uniqueness (meaningful, valuable)? Every object is the result of its prehistory. Let's divide the factors that influenced the formation of an object into groups: - stochastic (Greek. stochasis - guesswork) - random, chaotic; - deterministic (Latin. determinare - to limit, to define) - predictable, lawfully determined; - emergent (Latin. emergere - to emerge, to appear) - caused by the indivisible interaction of elements of a developing system. The consequences of stochastic factors are unique but not valuable. The consequences of deterministic influences are reproducible and are grounds for protection from a utilitarian point of view. Emergent properties are unique and give the object ethical value. This approach can be applied to both living and non-living, natural and artificial objects. Coins in one batch differ from each other stochastically. Their main features and denomination are determined deterministically. If a coin reflects a unique stage of history or a person's life, such emergent features give it ethical value. By imagining changes in the state of objects as their trajectories in a certain phase space, we will see that deterministic factors determine the main trajectories of change, along which movement occurs in such a space. Stochastic factors provide noise that affects this development—random deviations of the trajectory. In the simplest case, no new quality arises from the interaction of these groups of factors: the object will arrive at its "destination," having undergone greater or lesser deviations. However, when a system reaches a critical level of complexity, the interaction of deterministic and stochastic processes can cause the emergence of emergent qualities. In phase space, this can be expressed by the appearance of special zones where a small deviation of the object's trajectory can cause unpredictable consequences. For example, the structure of the human brain is determined by heredity and life experience, including learning. Random events of past life and quantum effects at the atomic level can make the decision-making process of a person in a particular situation not fully predictable. Knowing all the prerequisites, we could still determine the probability of a particular action, but not predict its outcome unambiguously. And if the choice a person makes is part of a complex of their actions, the emergent result of such uncertainty can be both brilliant insight and a simple logical error. The differences between organisms in the same population reflect the influence not only of stochastic (gene recombination) and deterministic (age, sex, etc.) but also of emergent processes (the formation of a unique individual during ontogenesis). If ontogenesis were an automatic unfolding of genetic information, it would not represent ethical value. However, the result of individual development depends on unpredictable epigenetic interactions (see section 5.26). We know two groups of processes in which ethically valuable (emergent) uniqueness develops: the development of complex systems and human creativity. The first group ("natural creativity") is diverse. It includes individual development (ontogenesis), ecosystem development (succession and phylocenogenesis), biosphere development and life evolution (phylogenesis), and the formation of human personality. Human creativity is manifested in the development of culture and society. Emergent processes determine the uniqueness of both the individual and the species to which it belongs. Comparing them, we can see that the value of objects is influenced by their potential immortality. The destruction of an individual causes less damage than the destruction of a species, as a species is potentially immortal. But even a mortal object can have significant ethical value. An individual of a rare species is more valuable than one of a numerous species, as its death more strongly affects the chances of species survival. The value of an individual is also related to its contribution to the formation of the next generation. In humans, a potentially immortal unique personality is formed in culture. Thus, the basis for recognizing the ethical value of a particular object can be its emergent uniqueness and potential immortality. The examples provided should not give the reader the impression that they are being offered a concept designed to choose who has the right to life and who does not. In addition to conservation ethics, other principles regulate human interactions. However, for example, medical practice involves different efforts to preserve the health of different people. Most of us consider the health care of children more important than caring for adults, and the protection of motherhood more important than the protection of fatherhood. The losses of civilian population, especially children and women, during military actions are considered more tragic than the deaths of military personnel. Thus, even with regard to humans, we intuitively apply certain principles that allow us to compare their relative value. If so, these principles must be understood, and the rational conservation ethics we are developing should not contradict these principles. Components of assessing grounds for protecting specific objects. How to determine which object needs protection first? For example, when it comes to forming objects of the natural reserve fund, the best way is to invite a recognized and competent specialist. The specialist will say which ecosystems are ordinary, which are irretrievably lost, and which are the best candidates for reservation (both in terms of their uniqueness and in terms of interaction with other objects and their unification into a single complex). What if there is no recognized authority, and expert opinions differ? Try to determine what parameters an ideal specialist would track, obtain an assessment of these parameters with the accuracy possible in the situation, and try to compare possible courses of action using these assessments. From the perspective of RCE, it is necessary to obtain an assessment of the actual and potential value of the objects being compared, their degree of uniqueness, and their degree of potential immortality. In addition, to determine the priority of protection objects, it is necessary to assess the danger threatening them, as well as the expected cost and effectiveness of conservation measures. The comparable courses of action should be evaluated not only for their direct effect (change in value and worth of potential protection objects) but also for their indirect effect on other objects (increase or decrease in their value and worth). In general, the nature of the relationship between the main parameters can be expressed using the following conditional formula: The very need to protect a particular object is a consequence of some danger threatening its existence. In the vast majority of cases, protection does not completely eliminate the threat of the object's demise but only reduces its probability. The effectiveness of protection can be assessed as the reduction in the probability of the object's demise due to protection measures. The uniqueness of an object can be assessed by determining the probability of the occurrence of its analogue, identical to the given object in essential properties. The measure of an object's potential immortality can be the probable duration of its existence if it is preserved in the short term (for which protection measures are planned). The approach outlined combines economic grounds for protecting objects with a formalized assessment of their ethical value. In addition to two economic assessments (the object's value, i.e., possible benefit derived from its existence, and the cost of protection measures), which require the involvement of economists, the formula uses probabilistic quantities related to the peculiarities of the origin and demise of the protected objects. The assessment of such probabilities should be the task of specialists studying this category of systems. It can be carried out both on the basis of statistical processing of empirical data describing the fate of similar objects and on the basis of modeling results of relevant natural systems. The practical application of the outlined approach requires the assessment of a multitude of parameters and is a rather complex research task. Fortunately, even solving individual issues (probability of occurrence of certain objects; assessment of their probable lifespan, etc.) is of independent interest. What is needed for the development of the views presented here? The search for methods for formalized assessment and comparison of parameters used in decision-making. Experience of practical application in any, initially quite narrow, field. Discussion of these ideas and their comparison with possible alternatives. The practice of discussing the views expressed in this section shows their sharp controversial nature. In any case, the authors hope that the discussion they have initiated on the issues raised here will contribute to more conscious conservation activities.